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Unintended consequences of governance reforms of European universities

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RESFRON Seminar, University of Milan, 16 February 2015.

A shorter and partly different version of this paper is forthcoming in Italian in *Scuola Democratica*. Also, it has been submitted to Palgrave Macmillan as a chapter of a book

1. The governance of European universities: from the "democratic revolution" to the "corporate enterprise model"?

In recent years, the issue of governance in higher education (HE) has been high on scholars' research agendas and a priority among the strategies adopted by policy-makers[1]. Universities have been under constant pressure from society and government to change their roles and behaviour; they have been called upon to be more responsive to the needs of economic development and to the challenges of globalization. At the same time, universities have suffered serious financial cutbacks which have forced them to act in a more responsive, accountable, efficient and effective way.

European governments' HE policies have attempted to converge towards a common template of "systemic governance" (van Vught 1989; Neave and van Vught 1991; Kickert 1997). The basic policy tools of this strategy consist of institutional autonomy, new competitive funding mechanisms, and the assessment of the quality of research and teaching (Gornitzka, Kogan and Amaral 2005; Lazzaretti and Tavoletti 2006; CHEPS 2006; Maassen and Olsen 2007; Trakman 2008; Huisman 2009; Paradeise *et al.* 2009; Capano 2011). In order to pursue this change in the governance of HE systems, most European governments have tried to change also the internal organization (or the "institutional governance") of their universities, which according to Clark's (1983) typology belong to what he terms the "Continental governance model", to the English-speaking countries' model. They have fostered more institutional leadership, greater managerial steering and fewer collegial decisions.

This process, strongly supported by the European Commission, has represented a significant break with the "democratic revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s (de Boer and Stensaker 2007) and it has often been summarized as a progressive shift of university governance towards a "corporate enterprise model" (Stensaker and Vabo 2013).

The *mantra* of "reforming governance" has characterized all recent efforts to transform universities in Europe. However, too often the political attention of decision-makers and the analytical attention of scholars have focused on the design of national reform strategies, whereas very little attention has been paid to their implementation by universities and to the actual changes that they have produced. This is because both policy-makers and several scholars tend to assume that a general policy strategy, or a national law reforming universities' institutional governance, directly determine the outcomes. But national reforms are interpreted, elaborated and implemented by the universities' internal actors – with their power resources, culture, learning abilities – which act as "filters" vis-à-vis the planned reforms.

[1] For a short review see Capano and Regini (2014)

In this paper I will focus on one specific and often neglected phenomenon which stands between reforms – or public policies more generally – and their outcomes: namely, the emergence of unanticipated consequences of reforms.

To study empirically the ways in which national reforms are implemented by individual universities, the extent to which some unintended consequences emerge in all of them, as well as the differences that we may observe, my colleagues and I have decided to focus on six national systems typifying the different ways in which HE is organized in Europe. These six countries are: the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain and Italy[2]. In order to analyse the implementation of these reforms and to understand how the new governance arrangements work in practice, we have opted for an in-depth case study approach and have selected 15 universities from five of the above-mentioned European countries: the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Spain. In Italy we could rely on 12 case studies of universities, as well as on an online questionnaire to all 66 state universities.

These cases are quite obviously a non-representative sample of European universities. In fact, we conceived our study as an exploratory one, and as such it does not aim to systematically test relations between an independent variable (the national governance reforms) and a dependent variable (the specific ways in which the universities' governance actually work). All we wanted to show is how some universities have internally re-organized, that is how the national reforms have forced them to question the established ways to deal with governance issues, and how a series of unintended consequences of these reforms have emerged.

For this reason, although we could not rely on a representative sample, we have selected our cases in such a way as to keep a few structural features of the universities under control. In other words, we have chosen "rather dissimilar cases" from each country, so that the organizational solutions and the unintended effects observed in a HE system cannot be attributed to specific features of the chosen universities, such as their size or location. To keep these variables under control, in each country we have chosen universities that differ, in terms of the aforesaid variables, to a similar extent than do the universities that we chose in the other countries. Table 1 and 2 below show that the variance within a country is not too dissimilar to the one that characterizes the universities selected from the other countries. Admittedly, we do not have perfect matches across countries;

[2] The fieldwork has been conducted by two UNIRES research teams coordinated by this author together with G. Capano. The team working on Italy was composed by M. Regini, G. Capano, M. Rostan, M. Turri, M. Anzivino, N. Casanova, E. Breno (see UNIRES 2014). The team working on the other European countries was composed by M. Regini, G. Capano, M. Turri, S. Colombo, V. Goglio, M.A. Ciclista, M. Cattaneo, D. Donina, I. Genuessi, M. Meoli, F. Porta (see Regini forthcoming; Capano and Regini forthcoming). The research has been funded by the Italian Ministry of Education.

however, roughly similar groups of cases should be all that is needed for an exploratory study like the present one. (**TABLE 1 AND 2 HERE)**

We analysed the institutional arrangements and dynamics in each of the 15 + 12 universities. Then we focused on two Faculties (or equivalent structures) in each university, and in doing so we tried to obtain a mix of professionally-oriented and academic Faculties, as well as of natural and medical sciences on the one hand, and humanities and social sciences on the other. In each institution, we interviewed all the relevant policy-makers (rectors or vice-chancellors, vice-rectors, general managers, deans, department chairs, etc.), in order to understand not just the formal arrangements, but also the actual decision-making processes.

2. Four components of the "corporate enterprise model": the objectives of governance reforms in European universities

The so-called "marketisation of higher education" has often been identified as an important driver of change in university governance in the last three decades (Etzkowitz *et al*., 2000; Kerr, 2001; Geiger, 2004; Teixeira *et al*., 2004). Although the term "marketisation" may be based on an inadequate understanding of what markets are and how they operate (Regini 2011, chapter 5; Musselin 2009; Schimank and Volkmann 2012), this trend has to some extent contributed to push back the notion of the university as a representative democracy in favour of more corporate governing structures streamlining internal decision-making (Power, 2007; Smith and Adams, 2009; Dill, 2012) and where it is the external rather than the internal voices that has the upper hand (Robbins, 2003; Tuchman, 2009). According to Stensaker and Vabo (2013, pp. 259-60), sometimes this external representation combined with a strengthened institutional leadership may trigger 'managerialism', which becomes a sort of generic narrative about the need for strategic change and institutional transformation (Reed, 2002), where the university is in need of becoming an organisational actor that responds to environmental challenges in a coherent way (Krücken and Meier, 2006).

This narrative has been popularized by the "New Public Management" that has become the dominant ideology in the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), strongly contributing to the idea that universities should be treated as corporate actors that are asked to operate in quasi-markets according to criteria of efficiency, competition and accountability.

We may highlight four main components of such "corporate enterprise model". In fact, the objectives that to various extents and in different ways have been pursued by all recent European reforms of university governance can be summarized as follows.

a) **Openness to the external world** in order not only to promote greater transparency in the management of universities and a closer match with the needs of the economy and society, but also to draw on abilities that have been developed in corporate organizational contexts, which are presumably more efficient (Amaral et al. 2003). This entails adoption of a system of shared governance, i.e. the allocation of decision-making functions concerning the budget, and more generally supervision/control of the work of the Rector's office, to a relatively small body (Board of Governors or the equivalent) in which members external to the university have a significant weight and role, and counter-balance the greater executive powers of the Rector.

b) **Disempowerment of the self-governing bodies**, i.e. the assignment of only consultative and propositive functions, mostly limited to the management of teaching and research, to the collegial bodies traditionally representative of the academic community (the Senate or Academic Board). This process is of course strictly related to the previous one and it often extends to the collective bodies representing the intermediate structures (Faculty Council or equivalent).

c) **Verticalization of decision-making processes** in order to enhance the efficiency of universities through a strong leadership, insulated from veto powers and spoils-system practices. The verticalization of decision-making is achieved by strengthening the powers and the monocratic role of the Rector/President/Vice-Chancellor, to whom all the national reforms have attributed crucial functions of strategic management. These functions may be exercised more effectively, the more the reforms require that the Rector be chosen on the basis of managerial capacity and not on the basis of the consensus that s/he enjoys; and the more the heads of the intermediate structures (Deans or the equivalent) are in a position to fulfil the role of the Rector's interlocutors and partners in the university's governance.

d) **Rationalization of the university's structures or organizational units** (the "academic heartland" described by Clark, 1998), i.e. Faculties, departments and schools. This implies a more precise allocation of responsibilities to those structures, the purpose being to introduce a simple and consistent organizational model by embedding them more closely in the overall organization, and to achieve economies of scale and a well-defined chain of responsibility.

3. Enter the "unanticipated consequences": some unexpected outcomes of university governance reforms

Having summarized the main goals of national reforms, what can we learn from the case studies on individual universities about the different ways in which these reforms have been implemented, and hence about the actual decision-making processes and behaviour of the actors concerned?

Both the case studies conducted within the research project described in section 1 and those carried out previously by other scholars (Maassen 2000, Capano and Regini 2011, Middlehurst 2013, Stensaker and Vabø 2013) show that national reforms, as was perhaps to be expected, have produced more radical results where their goals have been more innovative and ambitious, and more uncertain results in those countries which have innovated little or done so in a contradictory manner. But the case studies also highlight some unintended consequences of these reforms: clearly apparent in the practical implementation of the reforms are further elements which were not present, not even implicitly, in the original objectives, and which complicate the picture usually furnished by traditional accounts.

Various strands of literature in the social sciences have highlighted how top-down change processes, such as the reforms of university governance in Europe, inevitably produce effects somewhat different from those expected. In fact, those who are subject to the change but have not been involved in the reform design tend to raise resistance and to deploy their power or cognitive resources in order to blunt the most disruptive effects of the change. More generally, what has come to be known as "implementation theory" has focused on explaining the conditions under which reforms – and public policies more generally – succeed or fail.

This type of analysis is very common in the HE literature as well, and it seeks to explain why apparently radical changes often produce effects that in practice fall far short of expectations. The ambitious study by Cerych and Sabatier (1986), for instance, examines a series of university reforms conducted in Europe in the 1970s to understand the factors of policy success or policy failure. On the basis of these findings they conclude that higher education reforms may succeed, but they highlight the forces that work against reforms: the most powerful of these forces is the capacity of various groups to mobilize resistance against the introduction of a reform.

It would be easy to find examples of this well-known phenomenon in our case studies. However, I maintain that it is more interesting – besides being more original – to focus on the unintended consequences of governance reforms in the Mertonian meaning of outcomes that are not the ones anticipated by the actors. In his seminal article on the "unanticipated consequences of purposive social action", in fact, Merton (1936) was not dealing with the obvious and often widespread resistance and obstacles to "purposive social action", but with how this action is designed by actors who do not fully anticipate its consequences for one of the following reasons:[3] ignorance stemming from the existing state of knowledge; error; immediacy of interests, namely exclusive concern with

[3] A fifth reason listed by Merton is what has come to be known as 'self-defeating prophecy'; this reason, however, seems less relevant to the present analysis.

short-term effects of action; finally, basic values that lead to an action irrespective of its long-term results.

In Merton's analytical framework, therefore, it is cognitive limits and the shortcomings of rationality that account for the unintended outcomes of reforms, even in the absence of any significant resistance to them. Moreover, these unforeseen consequences are not necessarily undesirable: in fact they may be unexpected benefits as much as unexpected drawbacks. To be sure, they may also amount to ‘perverse effects’, i.e. ones contrary to what was originally intended, but this is just one sub-category, which was later developed especially by Boudon (1977).

Reforms of HE governance are no exception to the type of “purposive social action” that produces important unanticipated consequences, but to date little attention has been paid to this aspect. In what follows I will, therefore, focus my analysis on it. If set in relation to the four main objectives of the national governance reforms described in the previous section, we may highlight these unintended consequences.

a) **The weakness of governing boards with lay members**. At best, the obvious lack of internal knowledge by the external members of the Boards of Governors tends to cause difficulties in the functioning of those bodies and their scant efficacy. But at many universities this has an even more damaging unintended consequence: these bodies comprising external members – to whom the reformers assigned the role of supervising and counter-balancing the executive (the rectorate) by leveraging their economic and social role – are often ‘captured’ by the very same executive bodies on which they are supposed to exercise supervision and control.

b) **The resilience of self-government.** Undermining the collegial bodies of self-government does not remove the need for the expertise of academics when decisions are to be taken and strategies devised. Nor does it affect the ‘resilience’ of a culture and practice of self-government typical of the academic community. This need and this resilience produce unintended consequences which are positive or negative depending on the point of view of those who consider them. They can be summarized as the emergence of new forums for discussion (or the strengthening of old ones) between the university executive and representatives of the academic staff, which work as functional substitutes for the self-governing bodies that have been dramatically weakened. In some countries, these forums consist in institutionalized meetings between rector and deans (The Netherlands) or department directors (Italy). In other countries (Spain) they more often take the form of a number of advisory or preparatory committees (specified in the university statutes or established *ad hoc*), which draw on the expertise of academics. Finally, informal relational and consultative networks come everywhere to the fore. Of course, networks of this kind have always existed, but they assume new importance precisely where the old collegiate

bodies (Senate, Faculty Council) have been most disempowered; and they make executive decisions that do not receive broad consensus difficult, and therefore rare.

c) **The emergence of a collective leadership**. If a 'rector leader' is to fulfil the crucial strategic management functions deriving from the verticalization of decision-making processes, s/he needs a team more stable and better able to work as a group compared with the collaborators of the former rector *primus inter pares*, who were usually assigned only specific tasks. All the reforms conceive the rector as an individual leader in charge of a formally monocratic role, but they design a set of key functions that in practice require a collective leadership. In all the universities studied, in fact, the strategic functions are performed by an executive team, which only in The Netherlands is defined as such by the law, whilst in the German and French universities it is envisaged by their statutes, and in the English and Spanish ones is established by practice. The role assumed by this team has the unintended and 'beneficial' consequence of attenuating the problem of the dependence of the university's governance on the personal characteristics of an individual leader, so that the decisions taken by the executive are more shared and less random. But in the Italian case, as we shall see, this unexpected benefit has come about in only some universities.

d) **The fluctuations between centralization and decentralization.** Finally, rationalization of the organizational structures has had temporary positive effects, but at the same time it has revived unresolved organizational dilemmas which the old model of governance had remedied with compromises. What is the optimal size of the internal units? Should they be large enough to allow for economies of scale and for a strong voice in negotiations with the executive, or small enough to foster identity and a sense of membership? To what extent can the university executive decentralize functions and responsibilities to these units in order to involve them in the overall organization, and to what extent should it instead centralize them so as to obtain standard performances? The resurgence of these dilemmas has the unforeseen consequence of a frequent oscillation between decentralization and centralization, which seems to contradict the pursuit by universities of a coherent pattern of reorganization. In countries like Italy, furthermore, rationalization – understood as uniform organizational simplification rather than as a flexible way to manage complexity – has the perverse effect of making many processes even more complex and laborious than they were previously.

These unintended consequences are evidenced, to varying extents and in different ways, by the universities of all the countries considered. In the following sections I shall try to illustrate them in more detail by citing a few examples from the universities studied.

4. The shortcomings of governing boards with lay members

Almost everywhere, governance reforms inspired by a corporate enterprise model have reduced the decision-making power of the traditional collegial bodies representing the academic staff (Senates or Academic Boards), and they have assigned crucial governing functions to relatively small bodies (Boards of Governors or equivalent) which include external members supposed to represent general interests, particularly those of the socio-economic system in which the university is embedded.

The number and presence of external members on these governing boards vary widely among the countries considered, and it is interesting to note that they are inversely proportional: it is precisely the smallest boards that have the largest number of external members. At Dutch universities, the *Raad van Toezicht* by law consists of five members, all of whom are external and appointed by the Minister of Education. At the British universities that we studied (all pre-1992), external members formed the majority of the 20-25 components of the Council or Board of Governors, while almost all the governors of the former polytechnics were external. Also at the German universities studied, external members formed the majority, which varied according to the law of the *Land*: 6 out of 11 in Heidelberg and Freiburg, 5 out of 7 in Lüneburg. At the French universities, before 2013 there were 7-8 external members, appointed by the rector, in a total of 20-30 components of the *Conseil d'Aministration*; the reform of 2013 provided for at least 8 external members, but has also increased the representatives of students and the administrative staff. On the other hand, at the Spanish universities, where the *Consejo de Gobierno* is very large, the 2007 law even eliminated the previous requirement that at least three members must be external: thus the University of Barcelona today has no external members among 40-45 components, while at Valencia and Zaragoza there are respectively 3 out of 56 and 3 out of 40.

Regardless of their highly variable composition, do these bodies perform their duties effectively? And particularly in countries where the reforms have been most radical, have those bodies indeed assumed the role of effective counterweights to the power of the rector in the highly verticalized decision-making structure established by the reforms?

Our university case studies raise many doubts in this regard. In a governance structure where the rector and his/her team everywhere perform strategic functions and not just executive and managerial ones, it becomes difficult for the governing boards to contribute actively to those functions or to exercise effective supervision. At the universities of Spain and France, it is the excessively large size of the governing body that makes this task difficult. By contrast, according to numerous interviewees, and as reported by other studies, at the Dutch, British and German universities it is paradoxically the large presence of external members – intended to be an effective

counterweight to the self-referentiality of the academic staff – that generates the greatest difficulties. An assumption of almost all the reforms of university governance was that, because external members are used to dealing with strategic alternatives in their own work environment, they can do so more effectively than members working within the university. But the everyday practice of universities demonstrates that this is not the case. In particular, the external members of the board of governors are unable to address research strategies, even less to select the products to be evaluated, because they obviously do not have sufficient skills or knowledge of the scientific environment.

In fact, an indicator of scant efficacy seems to be the frequency of meetings by these governing bodies, which at almost all the universities studied (except the Dutch ones, for which we have no information on this point) meet no more than 4-6 times a year – which is decidedly too seldom for them to perform an effective and important steering role.

Hence, for various reasons, governing/supervisory bodies (boards of directors or equivalent) with external members prove largely ineffective, whereas they should instead act as counterweights to the rector and the senior management team by leveraging their economic and social role. Moreover, these difficulties are particularly evident at the universities of the countries which first and most radically adopted the model of shared governance.

Particularly illuminating in this regard is Shattock's (2013) analysis of the English case: "The danger of this situation is that the governing body is not made aware of alternative policy options or is not confronted with alternative views as to the policy environment…. Some governing bodies do not even receive academic board or senate minutes and are thus both cut off from the core business of the university and are entirely dependent on the executives' interpretation of academic priorities and expectations…. The consequences can be overreliance on a single source of advice and information from the executive, a too limited understanding of the core business and a growing gap and potential breakdown of trust between the academic community and those who are seen as the decision makers" (pp. 223-4).

In Italy, implementation of the 2010 reform seems to have strengthened the role of the rector much more than that of the governing body (*Consiglio d'Amministrazione*), which together with the rector was intended to be the real engine of university strategy and planning. In fact, the reality which emerges on reading the new university statutes is one of 'capture' of the governing body by the rector: in fully 33 out of 59 universities (excluding the smaller 'special institutes' (*istituti speciali*)), the rector directly influences the appointment of some or all members of the *Consiglio d'Amministrazione*, and in 17 others s/he plays an indirect role in it.

As regards the external members of these governing bodies, it is still too early to say how their competences with respect to the academic world and their motivations may affect their capacity to fulfil the new functions assigned to them by the reform law. At present, we know that at the end of 2013 only 25 of the 60 universities which had selected their governing bodies had opted for a *Consiglio d'Amministrazione* with 11 members, and therefore with at least three external ones.[4] More than half of these external members (57%) originated from the private sector, just under a quarter (24%) from the university and research sector, and just under a fifth (19%) from the public sector. These percentages largely reflect those of the candidatures submitted. They thus indicate both a considerable interest in universities by the private sector and the readiness of universities to respond to that interest. (**TABLE 3 HERE**).

5. The resilience of self-government

Given the difficult functioning of governing/supervisory bodies (boards of governors or equivalent) comprising external members, it is perhaps easier to understand two findings of our case studies which otherwise might seem surprising. The first finding – which concerns formal decision-making processes – is the widespread use of advisory and preparatory committees, or of similar forms of assemblies (specified in the university statutes or established *ad hoc*) composed mainly of academics. These committees and assemblies apparently play a more crucial role than in the past in the university's management but also in decisions on strategy. The second finding – which concerns outcomes – is that top-level decisions taken without broad consensus are extremely rare at all the universities studied. The reason is that an extensive informal network of relationships and consultations is activated before any such decisions are reached.

Taken together, these two findings indicate that the disempowerment of the traditional collegial governing body of the university – the academic senate – has produced an unexpected effect: in a sense, self-government by the academic community still continues, though in different, less institutional forms. Of course, this unexpected effect can partly be explained by the 'resilience' at all levels of a self-government culture typical of the academic community. But if it is set in relation to the discussion of the previous section on the difficult functioning of governing/supervisory bodies with external members, it probably also indicates the limitations of a managerial approach to university governance and the need to make the most of the expertise of academic staff, albeit in more informal terms.

[4] In fact, the reform law stipulates that the *Consiglio d'Amministrazione* must consist of a maximum of 11 members, including the rector and elected representatives of the students. The external governors must be no less than three if the board is composed of 11 members, and no less than two if it is composed of a smaller number of members.

To be sure, our case studies leave little doubt that the disempowerment of the academic senate pursued by all recent university reforms has been largely achieved. Not only does this body now have solely advisory and representational functions at all universities studied, but at some of them (for instance, UCL and the three Spanish universities) it is decidedly bloated – with between 250 and 300 members – and thus unable to perform even these functions. By contrast, at other universities (like the three Dutch ones), the academic senate is so small – between 13 and 18 members – that any notion of representation of the academic community is unfeasible: and, in fact, the statute of the University of Amsterdam states that it is only optional.

Yet it is precisely the Dutch universities that highlight how self-government by the academic community can arise again in different forms. Those that we studied have created, besides the bodies established by the law, an ‘Executive Council’ consisting of the three members of the Executive Board (*College van bestuur*) and the deans, which meets monthly and seems to have become an important forum for discussion and shared decision-making.

Besides meeting the deans in this new body, at Amsterdam the Executive Board has constant relationships with them. The rector also meets each dean individually every six weeks. Moreover, the Executive Board periodically visits the faculties. These visits last at least half a day, and their purpose is to inspect the state of teaching and research, as well as the financial situation. In turn, each faculty has a precise schedule of meetings: the dean meets the directors of departments and schools once a week.

At Leiden, relations between the Executive Board and the middle management are even more ramified: in fact, there are regular meetings between the rector and the deans, between the deputy rector and the vice-deans, between the vice-president and the administrative heads of the faculties, and between the rector and the directors of the institutes. Decision-making processes are characterized by a significant density of relations and a search for broad and solid consensus. This, therefore, is a markedly ‘horizontal’ system which retains some features of the previous one.

These features could be already deduced from the interviews conducted during our previous research: “in the English and the Dutch cases, the highly verticalized organizational arrangements are enforced not in a mechanical, bureaucratic manner, but through an ongoing process of consultation and negotiation, involving those with monocratic roles (deans, directors, rectors/vice-chancellors). Thus these highly hierarchical arrangements are coupled with a *de facto* consensual process aimed at striking a balance between the needs of the internal organizational units and the strategic goals of the university as a whole. This means that the managerialization and professionalization pursued by such arrangements do not produce top-down, authoritarian decision-making, but a policy dynamics based on network relationships between individuals situated at

different institutional levels" (Capano and Regini 2014, pp. 88-9). However, this phenomenon concerns not only the British and Dutch universities but also those of the other countries that we considered. It is therefore not a kind of counterweight necessary only where the verticalization process has gone furthest. The relational structure between top and middle management appears to be very dense at British and Dutch universities, where offices are by appointment and which have a strongly verticalized decision-making system, as well as at the universities with traditionally collegial government and direct election to offices like the Spanish and the Italian ones, and also at those universities in intermediate situations like the French and German ones.

At Heidelberg, for example, besides the meetings of the Senate and various committees, every semester the rector invites all the deans to an informal discussion on the university's prospects. And also the decision-making process within the departments is characterized by a low level of formalization and a search for consensus. Although the director of the department is formally responsible for all decisions, they are always informally adopted by consensus. Every term, three to four meetings are held with academic staff of every level and representatives of doctoral and post-doctoral students in order to discuss all important issues. These are in every respect informal department councils, even though they are not foreseen by the university statute. At Freiburg, the relationships between deans and the university's top management are both formal and informal. The deans, who are elected from among the full professors every four years, regularly meet with both the vice-rectors and the Board of Governors to discuss management problems, and strategic issues as well. At Lüneburg, meetings of this kind are held once a month, and many decisions are taken at them. But there are also numerous direct informal meetings among the deans.

Also the French interviewees stressed that any change at the university requires forums for discussion in which to agree on a position shared with large part of the academic community. At Paris-Sud, for example, despite the strengthening of the figure of the President, the current management was described by interviewees as "collegial and ready to delegate". Also at Strasbourg there was an apparent willingness on the part of the Executive Board – but more generally in the statutory rules – to moderate the exercise of central authority and to seek broad consensus. In this regard, the powers that the law has assigned to the President are used prudently, and the university statute reserves important functions to the 'Congress', an elected collegial body not foreseen by the 2007 law.

Finally, the use of advisory and preparatory committees is particularly widespread at Spanish universities, in which there are also extensive networks of relationships and informal consultations. At Barcelona, for example, the dean of Chemistry candidly admitted that if a problem came directly before the *Junta de Facultad*, no one would know what to do. This is why the work of preparatory

committees is crucial: the problem is first discussed informally to find possible solutions, then by a committee where the solution is negotiated, and only finally by the *Junta de Facultad*, whose members have only to approve the solution decided. At Valencia, there is a highly-developed network of informal relationships within the university, and continuous exchange between the top leadership and middle management, but also within middle management itself. According to our interviewees, there is no strong centralization, and the governance system is instead perceived as a distribution chain connecting all the actors, both collegial and individual, through mainly informal meetings and communications. Outside the institutional calendar, in fact, monthly meetings are held between the rector and the deans of all the faculties, and weekly meetings between all eighteen deans and between deans and department heads.

As regards the Italian case, the 'resilience' of a culture and forms of self-government typical of academic communities was confirmed by the interviews conducted at the twelve universities chosen as case studies. According to our interviewees, in virtually no case has the *Consiglio d'Amministrazione* deliberated differently from, or without taking account of, the opinion of the Senate. Moreover, as at the other European universities, widespread use is made of advisory and preparatory committees (specified in the university statutes or established *ad hoc*) which draw on the expertise of academics. And also at the Italian universities there are dense networks of relationships and informal consultations that make top-level decisions not taken with broad consensus difficult and therefore very rare.

6. From individual to collective leadership: the growing importance of the Rector's team

In almost all the universities that we studied, the team flanking the rector seems to have gained growing importance as an effective management body. In The Netherlands, the Executive Board (*College van bestuur*) is required by law to be very small in its composition: it therefore consists of the rector, president and vice-president, and it is appointed by a Board of Directors composed only of external members, in their turn appointed by the Minister of Education. In the German and French universities, the rector's team is a statutory executive body (often called *Rektorat* or *Präsidium* in the former, and *Bureau* in the latter) formed of the rector, the vice-rectors and the finance director, added to whom in some cases are a couple of senior professionals: a total of 5 to 6 members at the German universities and around 10 at the French ones. In the English universities, this body ('Senior management team' or equivalent) is not envisaged by their statutes, but in practice its composition is rather well defined: vice-chancellor, deputy and pro-vice-chancellors, finance director and chief operating officer. Finally, in the Spanish universities that we studied, the

Consejo de Direccion was defined by their statutes, and it was larger in its composition: besides the rector, between 10 and 16 vice-rectors and delegates, the chief operating officer, and between 1 and 4 administrative managers.

The verticalization of the decision-making process is therefore to some extent counterbalanced by the institutionalization of a collegiate structure of governance. Consequently, decisions are the result of collective work, and less dependent on the rector's individual characteristics. Moreover, we know that at British universities the number of pro-vice-chancellors has increased substantially in recent years, and that the senior management team has extended its range of action in response to the need to strengthen the 'strategic capacity' of universities to undertake their more extensive functions (Middlehurst, 2013, pp. 283-4; Shattock, 2013, p. 228). Besides the vice-rectors, the presence of senior professionals in the collegial governing body resolves the historical duality between academic decision-making bodies and administrative ones. At British and German universities the finance director has acquired greater power, so that the Board of Governors consults this figure more frequently than the rector for guidance and reassurance. Hence, the team does not have simply the task of working with the rector on specific matters; rather, its task is to ensure collegial leadership of the university. At almost all the universities studied, in fact, the rector's team meets weekly as a strong executive able to take decisions and implement them.

Our emphasis on the crucial role assumed by the Rector's team at the universities studied is not at all to underestimate the process of verticalization that has affected those universities by concentrating strategic decisions at their apex and reconfiguring them as more unitary and vertically integrated organizations (Enders, De Boer and Leislye 2008). It shows, however, that apparently not corroborated is the further conclusion that is often drawn (Carvalho 2014): namely that collective decision-making is giving way to an individual process. And that perhaps excessive alarm has been raised by some scholars concerning "the danger posed by the dominant vice-chancellor surrounded by a compliant group that he or she has largely recruited" (Shattock, 2013, p. 231).

By contrast, both where vice-rectors are elected by a collegial body, albeit on proposal by the rector (as at UCL, Strasbourg, Heidelberg or Lüneburg), and where they are directly appointed by the rector (as at Paris-Sud, Valencia or Zaragoza), apparently well-established is the idea that university leadership can only be collective. Hence the rector's individual characteristics matter for institutional performance, but they are somewhat tempered by the collective nature of the decision-making process.

This unintended consequence of verticalization has not yet fully emerged in Italian universities, which exhibit a marked variability of executive structures and very weak institutionalization of the rector's team (UNIRES 2014). The replies to the questionnaire administered to the 66 state

universities, in fact, showed large differences in the number of vice-rectors, ranging from the 43.6% of universities where at most one vice-rector was appointed to the 24.2% which had more than five (**TABLE 4 HERE**). Also the organization of work indicated low institutionalization: formal meetings between rector and vice-rectors were held at only 60% of universities, and weekly meetings at only 11.3%. In 65% of cases these meetings were also attended by the chief executive, and in a smaller percentage by other senior professionals or other members of the academic staff. These data indicate that the idea of a 'Rector's team' exercising collective leadership is relatively rare at Italian universities compared with those of other countries. That the team meets at regular intervals only in some cases shows that a substantial number of Italian universities are governed on an impromptu basis, or through an individualized relational style (between the rector and the members of his/her team). More generally, this practice may be indicative of a low propensity to plan and organize governance activities and, therefore, also the strategies to be pursued. But it is certainly indicative of a tendency to conceive the Rector's team as more a set of intermediaries dealing with the university's organizational units and with internal and external stakeholders than as a real 'executive' of the university.

7. The fluctuations between centralization and decentralization

Also with regard to the final goal of the governance reforms – rationalization of the university's structures or organizational units – the United Kingdom has preceded the other European countries. Two studies by Hogan (2012) show that between 1993 and 2002, out of 81 universities examined, fully 74% redesigned their structuring into faculties (usually by reducing their number, but sometimes by abolishing them or converting them into colleges) and into departments (sometimes merging them into schools, which may or may not pertain to the faculty); and that between 2002 and 2007 this process accelerated further. Hence the British universities began to reorganize their academic structures well before the continental ones, primarily to create a few but generally large units. This reorganization brought with it a decentralization of financial management, which in many universities has extended to decisions relative to human resources allocation. The argument used to justify this decentralization of functions and powers has been that the increased size due to the explosion of the 'mass university' caused a decision-making overload for the university's centre, forcing it to delegate numerous decisions to the lower levels.

However, Shattock (2013) argues that the recent economic crisis, with the widespread perception of the volatility of the financial situation and the risks connected therewith, has led to re-centralization. The prospects of downsizing due to austerity policies, in fact, persuade the university top leadership

to reduce the share of decision-making power on resources that had been delegated to the periphery. And the same effect is produced by national research assessment exercises, which raise expectations of rewards and incentives to be managed by the centre.

Our case studies show that these uncertainties – or this oscillation between decentralization to the periphery of the university and centralization to its top leadership – concern not only the British universities but also those of other countries. In Germany and Spain a tendency to decentralize seems to prevail, while in France the opposite appears to be the case. But the empirical evidence suggests that the situation is far more uncertain and unclear. This uncertainty appears to be the unintended consequence of rationalization policies that seek uniform and simplifying answers to complex organizational dilemmas for which there is no one-size-fits-all solution (Capano and Regini 2014). What is the optimal size of university's organizational units? Should they be large enough to allow for economies of scale and for a strong voice in negotiations with the executive, or small enough to foster identity and a sense of membership? To what extent can the university executive decentralize functions and responsibilities to these units in order to involve them in the overall organization, and to what extent should it instead centralize so as to obtain standard performances? The rationalization policies revive these and other organizational dilemmas which the old governance model had resolved with compromises.

At German universities, the *Rektorat* or *Präsidium* generally negotiates downwards, with the deans of the various faculties, on 'programme agreements' similar to those negotiated upwards with the ministry, in a 'cascade' negotiation process. The University of Heidelberg, for example, decided in 2006 to implement a system of financial resources decentralization in accordance with the principle that the peripheral structures in which teaching and research take place – not only the faculties but also the small institutes or research centres – can allocate these resources more efficiently and effectively than the centre. However, it also decided that the rector and the director-general could intervene at any time, and with even radical measures, in cases of poor performance or non-transparent administration.

Considered even more radical by our interviewees was the organizational, financial, and decision-making decentralization process that has taken place at the University of Barcelona in the past decade. Until 2003, the nineteen faculties of this mega-university were grouped into five Divisions, which constituted a meso-level superordinate to the faculties and had both administrative and policy-making functions. In 2003 the Divisions were eliminated to simplify the university's organizational structure, and their functions were devolved to the faculties, thereby significantly increasing the powers of the deans. But this drastic 'simplification' has also produced unexpected negative consequences, which may lead to a rethinking of the system. The two deans that we

interviewed (Chemistry and Economics), in fact, admitted that the previous structure had been redundant, but they pointed out that the new organization has two shortcomings. The first is that nineteen faculties are too many for their deans to participate in the university's strategic planning and to negotiate with the top leadership just as effectively as the presidents of the old divisions did. The second is that many issues of common interest to the same macro-area are now addressed by different faculties, with the risk of overlaps and contradictions. It is therefore likely that an attempt will be made to remedy these unintended consequences with some form of re-centralization.

In France, where until 1968 the universities were simple confederations of faculties, the governing bodies have long sought to move in the opposite direction: that of resuming a coherent organizational model for the faculties by making them integral parts of the overall organization. It is understandable that, given the historical legacy and a situation of considerable organizational complexity, the governing bodies of the French universities are more inclined to centralize decision-making than are their counterparts in other European countries. Yet at the University of Strasbourg, for example, the relationship between the university top leadership and faculties is problematic and still being defined. It is at Strasbourg that we find the organizational solution that perhaps best epitomizes both the aim of rationalizing the internal structure of universities by making their units more fully integral parts of their overall organization, and the difficulty, uncertainty, and often failure of these attempts. The solution has been to establish nine *Collegiums*, original structures given the task of coordinating fully 38 organizational units including faculties, institutes and schools, plus 75 research units (Capano and Regini 2014). In reality, the competences of these *Collegiums* and the mechanisms of their management and operation are unclear. Moreover, they seem to differ according to the disciplinary area (for example, in humanities the *Collegium* has an important role in coordinating academic programmes, but not in the scientific-technological area). In order not to multiply the intermediate structures, the *Collegiums* have received neither financial nor human resources. They therefore represent a compromise between maintaining the previous structures and restricting the number of the executive's interlocutors: an emblematic example of the difficulty of managing organizational complexity by adopting internal governance models that are often efficient and coherent only on paper.

As regards Italy, a declared purpose of the 2010 reform was organizational simplification by abolishing the faculties with their functions of managing teaching activities and recruitment, and by assigning these functions to the departments, which were already in charge of managing research activities. But, far from making the management of teaching activities more simple, this reform has made it more complicated. In fact, the departments are structures which must comprise "lecturers and researchers pertaining to homogeneous scientific areas", while the degree programs offered to

students mostly require a differentiated range of disciplinary abilities. Consequently, the main problem faced by universities in implementing the reform has been this: how to deliver multi-disciplinary courses through departments comprising only some of the disciplinary competences required?

As shown in table 5, the most frequent response has been to assign the management of a degree program to the department whose members offer more than half of the credits for that program: this has been the case in 70% of the degree programs offered by Italian state universities, which for this purpose have probably created departments more heterogeneous in disciplinary terms than envisaged by the reform law. But, in the large universities, more than one third of the degree programs are managed in more complex manner [**TABLE 5 HERE**]. They are mostly allocated to departments which offer less than half of the credits for those programs, and which must therefore negotiate important decisions with the other departments associated with them in the delivery of teaching and of the associated activities (orientation, internships, student exchange, placement, etc.). In other cases, they are allocated to ad hoc inter-departmental structures that are poorly institutionalized. In all these cases, the universities try to manage the complexity of degree programs, not through drastic simplifications but through the creation of mechanisms that can be called ‘functional substitutes’ for the former faculties as the deliverers of multidisciplinary programs. However, the perverse effect is that the universities have had to create inevitably weak mechanisms for coordination which are required to perform functions analogous to those that the faculties used to perform robustly.

8. Conclusions: why these unintended consequences?

At this point, one may wonder why these unintended consequences of the reform of university governance have occurred, to a greater or lesser extent, in all the universities studied in the various European countries, even though they have governance structures rather different from each other, and decision-making mechanisms of varying efficacy.

The evidence collected does not allow an empirically grounded answer to be given to this question. However, my hypothesis is that the reasons reside in a generalized and systematic underestimation by the reformers of three aspects that characterize university institutions everywhere:

1. the specific nature of universities and their functioning, which makes it difficult to import models developed in other contexts such as businesses or public administrations;
2. the organizational complexity due to the plurality of functions entrusted to universities, which makes rationalization aimed at simplification problematic and sometimes counterproductive;

3. the marked diversity of higher education institutions, which makes adoption of homogeneous and standardizing models difficult and often ineffective.

This systematic underestimation may be due to different combinations of factors that, as noted in section 3 above, Merton (1936) cited as responsible in general for the production of unanticipated consequences: ignorance, error, exclusive concern for short-term results, and values that induce a particular action.

8.1. Underestimation of the specific nature of universities

An underestimation of the specific nature of universities seems mainly responsible for the first two types of unintended consequences: that is, the difficult functioning of small governing bodies comprising members from outside the university, and the emergence of new forms of self-governance that appear to be functional substitutes for the disempowerment of the traditional collegial bodies (see Sections 4 and 5). The corporate enterprise model of governance that has inspired national reforms to varying extents, in fact, assumes that decisions should be taken, not by the representatives of those who obtain benefits or disadvantages (the academic staff) from these decisions, but by persons who represent more general interests of society, which finances universities and therefore wants to ensure that they obtain maximum benefits.

This governance model is undoubtedly legitimized by the vices produced by self-government that more than two centuries ago Adam Smith already identified in opportunism and collusive or self-referential choices: "If the authority to which [the teacher] is subject resides in the body corporate, the college, or university, of which he himself is a member, and which the greater part of the other members are, like himself, persons who either are or ought to be teachers, they are likely to make a common cause, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man to consent that his neighbour may neglect his duty, provided he himself is allowed to neglect his own" (Smith 1776, p. 589).

The problems of the collegial self-government of universities, however, are broader and more numerous than the tendency to opportunism and collusive choices. Often mentioned among these problems are inefficient decision-making, the opacity of the chain of responsibility, spoils-system practices, and amateurism. There is no doubt that the shared governance model finds legitimacy in these underlying vices of self-government and proves in many ways superior to it in terms of efficiency, rapidity, and the ability to make selective choices.

However, the unresolved problem of shared governance when applied to institutions like universities is that only scientific communities are in a position to assess problems and prospects in their own areas. It should be seen as no coincidence that, right after the sentence quoted above, Adam Smith hastens to add: "If the authority to which [the teacher] is subject resides, not so much

in the body corporate of which he is a member, as in some other extraneous persons – in the bishop of the diocese, for example; in the governor of the province; or, perhaps, in some minister of state – it is not indeed in this case very likely that he will be suffered to neglect his duty altogether. All that such superiors, however, can force him to do, is to attend upon his pupils a certain number of hours, that is to give a certain number of lectures in the week or in the year. What those lectures shall be must still depend upon the diligence of the teacher; and that diligence is likely to be proportionated to the motives which he has for exerting it. An extraneous jurisdiction of this kind, besides, is liable to be exercised both ignorantly and capriciously. In its nature it is arbitrary and discretionary, and the persons who exercise it, neither attending upon the lectures of the teacher themselves, nor perhaps understanding the sciences which it is his business to teach, are seldom capable of exercising it with judgement" (ibidem).

In more contemporary language and more general terms we may set the problem in this way: the public goods produced by universities (highly qualified human capital and research results) are very special goods, whose features can only be determined by their producers, not by the bureaucracy or the market. What the most promising directions for research are, from whom and in what ways is it most likely to get results, what knowledge is more appropriate to transmit and with what methods: these are all choices which only the relevant scientific communities are competent to make, and university bureaucracies cannot but leave such choices to them. (Whitley 2000).

The main organizational dilemma thus becomes the following: to what extent should preference be given to solutions that prevent collusive and self-referential choices, and to what extent should preference be given to knowledge from inside of the situations on which to act? The absence of collusive and self-referential choices implies that the bodies which decide or propose the allocation of resources cannot consist of those who use those resources. On the other hand, as noticed, only scientific communities are in a position to evaluate problems and prospects in their own areas. It is not easy to find balanced solutions to this dilemma. But policy-makers often lack even the awareness of the very terms of the dilemma. The reasons, in Mertonian terms, can be identified in a mix of errors of analysis (concerning the university's specificities), the prevalence of short-term interests in productive and efficient universities over a long-term interest in the effective production of public goods, and the predominance of a value system that tends to neglect the idea itself of public goods.

8.2. Underestimation of the organizational complexity due to the plurality of university functions

Underestimation of the organizational complexity of institutions required to perform numerous functions instead appears to be the main cause of the occurrence of the third unintended consequence, i.e. the spread of a conception of the roles of the executive as ones of collective leadership (see Section 6). It appears also to be co-responsible for the fourth unintended consequence, i.e. the uncertain and often contradictory effects of rationalization (see Section 7), to which I shall return below.

The verticalization of decision-making that has led everywhere to a strengthening of the rector's powers has also been inspired to a large extent by a corporate model of governance. To make rapid, effective and non-collusive decisions possible, it appeared necessary to preserve the rector from the veto powers and to define his/her role no longer in the traditional terms of *primus inter pares* but in ones similar to those of the managing director of a large company. However, rectors, at least at European universities, are not managers by profession, but academics. As such, they are directly aware of the enormous complexity of universities as organizations that must perform a plurality of functions, usually by reconciling the needs and habits of very different disciplinary areas; and that for this very reason require an executive possessing a plurality of characteristics and abilities, often very different from each other. As argued by Middlehurst (2013, p. 283) who cites Breakwell and Tytherleigh,"vice-chancellors' own perceptions of their roles and the characteristics associated with them suggest four sets of necessary competences: academic-related characteristics associated with gaining credibility and influence; business-related characteristics to deal with diversified funding streams and 'branding' of institutions; managerial and leadership characteristics associated with two key responsibilities: an external representative profile (locally, nationally and internationally) and working with and through a senior management team, an Academic Board or Senate and a governing body; and fourth, personal characteristics including physical and intellectual resilience (emotional resilience is increasingly important too)". All this requires a collective leadership that can only be exercised by a governance team.

8.3. Underestimation of the heterogeneity of university institutions

Finally, underestimation of the heterogeneity, as well as the organizational complexity, of universities – which makes adoption of homogeneous and standardizing models difficult and often ineffective – appears to be mainly responsible for the fourth unintended consequence: the uncertain and often contradictory effects of rationalization (see Section 7). Exemplary in this regard is the Italian reform of 2010, which was intended to simplify the internal structure of universities by abolishing the faculties and transferring all functions to the departments, without considering the

very different effects that this 'simplification' would produce in large universities with respect to small ones.

In general, the goal of simplification, as well as that of economies of scale, pursued by this reform has proved much easier to achieve in small and medium-sized universities than in large and mega ones. In fact, at small and medium-sized universities, the pre-reform departments have been replaced by larger departments roughly equal in number to the old faculties. At these universities, therefore, the reform has achieved the goal of unifying into a single organization competences previously divided between faculties and the old departments. Consequently, these form an organizational structure that enables the university executive to have frequent and direct interactions with the organizational units (still few in number), and simultaneously enables these organizational units to maintain their right to representation in the governing bodies (in particular, the academic senate).

At the larger universities, and especially the mega universities (those with more than 40,000 students), however, the reform has led to the creation of new departments in a number sometimes considerably larger than the old faculties. Hence, at these universities, the unification of the competences previously assigned respectively to the faculties and departments has indeed taken place, but to the detriment of the organization's compactness. Moreover, the larger universities exhibit two features characterizing relations between centre and periphery: the lack of representation of all the departments in the academic senate; and the presence of a substantial percentage of technical and administrative staff at the departments. It is these universities, therefore, that will severely test the efficacy of the new tools of organizational coordination that are being devised to replace the functions once performed by the faculties: the schools that may or may not be created to coordinate teaching activities; the assemblies of department heads, that may be established formally or informally; and the central administration's involvement in management of the technical-administrative staff assigned to the departments.

Hence, the reform has required all universities to unify activities that concern teaching, research, and recruitment into a single structure, the department. At the smaller universities this has resulted in the transformation of the old faculties into departments, i.e. the creation of new organizational structures of a size and number similar to those of the old faculties. At the large and mega universities, by contrast, new departments significantly larger in number than the old faculties have been created. Hence, whilst at the small and medium-sized universities the net effect of the reform on internal organizational structures has been actual simplification – i.e. the concentration of decisions into organizational units of the same size as the old faculties – at the large and mega

universities the concentration of decisions has been accompanied by a fragmentation of organizational units (at least when compared with the old faculties).

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Table 1: main features of the 15 universities studied in UK, NL, D, F, E

University	*Size* (*no. of students enrolled*)	*Location* (*metropolis vs. city vs. small town*)
Manchester	Large (40.000)	City
University College London (UCL)	Medium (25.000)	Metropolis
Leicester	Small (18.000)	City
Amsterdam (UvA)	Large (30.000)	Metropolis
Leiden	Medium (20.000)	Small town
Maastricht	Small (16.000)	Small town
Heidelberg	Large (30.000)	Small town
Freiburg	Medium (21.000)	City
Lüneburg (Leuphana)	Small (7.000)	Small town
Strasbourg	Large (42.000)	City
Paris Sud	Medium (27.000)	Metropolis
Tours [*case study* under way]	Medium (21.000)	Small town
Barcelona (UB)	Large (81.000)	Metropolis
Valencia	Large (55.000)	City
Zaragoza	Large (37.000)	City

Table 2: Italian state universities by area and size (no. of students)
(in bold and italics the 12 universities on which case studies have been conducted)

UNIVERSITY	North	Centre	South	TOTAL
Mega (> 40.000)	***Torino***, Milano, Padova, Bologna	***Firenze***, Pisa, Roma Sapienza	***Catania,*** Napoli, Bari, Palermo	**11**
Large (20-40.000)	***Milano Bicocca***, Milano Politecnico, Torino Politecnico, Pavia, Verona, Parma, Genova	***Roma Tre,*** Perugia, Roma Tor Vergata	***Chieti***, L'Aquila, Napoli Seconda, Salerno, Calabria, Messina, Cagliari	**17**
Medium (10-20.000)	***Venezia Cà Foscari***, Bergamo, Brescia, Ferrara, Modena, Trento, Trieste, Udine	***Marche Politecnica***, Siena, Urbino, Macerata, Cassino	***Salento,*** Foggia, Napoli Parthenope, Bari Politecnico, Sassari	**18**
Small (< 10.000)	***Insubria***, Piemonte Orientale, Venezia IUAV Trieste SISSA, Pavia IUSS	***Pisa Normale***, Pisa S.Anna, Lucca IMT, Camerino, Tuscia, Roma Foro italico Siena stranieri, Perugia stranieri	***Napoli Orientale***, Teramo, Molise, Sannio, Basilicata, Reggio Calabria, Catanzaro	**20**
TOTAL	**24**	**19**	**23**	**66**

Table 3. Number of external members of Boards of directors and of candidacies, by occupational sector

SECTOR	External candidacies No.	External candidacies %	External members No.	External members %	Rate of acceptance of external candidacies (%)
University and research	206	19,8	39	23,9	18,9
Private (business) sector	589	56,5	93	57,0	15,8
Public sector	247	23,7	31	19,0	12,6
Total	**1042**	**100,0**	**163**	**100,0**	**15,6**

Table 4. No. of vice-rectors in Italian universities

	No. universities	%
None	5	8,1
1 vice-rector	22	35,5
Between 2 and 5 vice-rectors	20	32,3
More than 5 vice-rectors	15	24,2
Total responses	**62**	**100,0**
Missing	4	

Table 5. Who manages the degree programs (DP)?

	DP managed by departmenst that ensure> 50% credits		***DP managed by departmenst that ensure< 50% credits***		***DP managed by other structures***		***Total DP offered by universities (58 out of 66)***
	No. DP	%	No. DP	%	No. DP	%	No. DP
University size							
Small	244	82,4	10	3,4	42	14,2	296
Medium	718	82,1	91	10,4	66	7,5	875
Large	821	65,4	216	17,2	219	17,4	1256
Mega	1158	65,6	329	18,7	277	15,7	1764
Total	**2941**	**70,2**	**646**	**15,4**	**604**	**14,4**	**4191**